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FOREWORD
This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph
(a) (1) (v) (F) of Article 1 and paragraph (b) (6) of Article 2
of Modification No.1 to JPL Contract 951709. This is Part II
of two parts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is the second and final part of the program final report
submitted in accordance with JPL Contract 951709. This Part II
r.!ers the period from April 1, 1968 through the completion of the
technical effort on May 9, 1969.
The program invo1ve(i the design, fabrication, and exposure of
a fueled bipropellant liquid propulsion system to the ethylene
oxide (ETO) and heat sterilization requirements specified by JPL
specification VOL-50503-ETS. After exposure the system was then
fired for 280 sec.
The program was continued to gather additional information
resulting from a second series of sterilization exposure cvcles
and additional materials compatibility tests. Insofar aL possible
the propulsion system was reassembled to the initial configuration
following evaluation of the effects of the initial exposure and
test firing. It was then exposed to three-30-hr.dry heat sterili-
zation cycles and refired for an additional 280 sec.
The initial portion of the program included a materials test-
ing activity and a components test activity wherein early test
results could be factored into the design and assembly of the
complete propulsion module. The initial portion of the program
was completed in March of 1968. Part I of the final report was
published as quickly as possible so systems designers might have
the benefit of the program results in a timely fashion. The au-
thor, in preparing Part II, assumes the reader is familiar with
Part I of the report.
The JPL Technical Monitor for the contract was Mr. Merle E.
Guenther. The Program Manager for Martin Marietta was Mr. Samuel
C. Lukens.
The following personnel at Martin Marietta were major contri-
butors to the follow-on effort:
H. F. Brady, Technical Lead;
C. Holt, Materials Test;
J. B. Keough, Systems Test.
Figure I-1 is a photo of the assembled module in a display stand.
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II. PROGRAM PLAN AND OBJECTIVES
A modification to the original contract statement of work
directed that the module with corrected components be reassembled,
exposed to added dry heat sterilization, and refired for 280 sec.
The program objective was to give increased assurance that the
propulsion module system would perform satisfactorily through a
second demonstration firing.
To implement the above activity several support activities
were initiated. A materials compatibility test program was im-
plemented to gather as much additional data as feasible. Twenty-
five additional materials specimens were exposed to N204 at
135°C for 600 hr. The results of the original effort yielded
sufficient materials compatibility data in MMH to give the de-
signer an adequate catalog of materials for selection.
A design change was implemented in both the fuel and oxidizer
tanks. It was an objective of the program to redesign the fuel
tank as necessary to demonstrate -1 g fuel outflow. This was done
by making several minor changes in the trap design. Further, the
oxidizer tank was redesigned to mount the diaphragm at the center-
line so that a symmetrical configuration of the diaphragm would be
achieved so that line-to-line contact with the tank wall would be
made in either the loaded or expelled position.
With the new tank designs the module was reassembled, loaded
with propellant, sterilized for three 30-hr, cycles at 135°C and
then test fired. This was a continuation of Task IV of the ori-
ginal program.
Management of the program was implemented by a project organi-
zation shown in Fig.II-1. This is the same organization used in
the initial program. It is characterized by the direct design and
engineering organization shown at the first level supported by
manufacturing, quality, and safety shown on the second level.
The equipment selection committee was inactive in this portion
of the program since no new components were identified or pro-
cured.
I
Stress
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Safety
IManufacturing	
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Fig. II-1 Program Organization
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III. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions that can be drawn from the results of this
Y
	 program are itemized below:
1) The cause of the aborted s iring attempt was the im-
proper assembly of an ordnance valve. This allowed burn-
ing combustion products and melted aluminum to enter the
system tubing, which led to a tube failure at a bend in
the tube;
2) The remaining system components and the Marquardt
engine operated satisfactorily following the second steri-
lization exposure;
3) The regulator was stuck in the open position after
storage of 15 months following the initial system firing 	 j
demonstration. This malfunction would have seriously jeo-
pardized a planetary mission. The cause was attributed
to a coagulated lubricating film in the area of the spring
guide and cap assembly. This problem can be solved with
no new technology;
4) The hand valves incorporated in the system showed the
same degradation as reported in Part I of this report;
5) The design of the oxidizer tank diaphragm girth seal
has been adequately demonstrated. Teflon permeation re-
mains an important factor in the diaphragm and tank design;
6) Fabrication and inspection techniques can .lead to de-
sign problems. The problem is manifested by membrane
stretch of the Teflon diaphragm due to inflation for in-
spection that results in a stress near the yield point;
7) Failure of one of the diaphragms was attributed to
maintaining pressure loads after the diaphragm was stretched
in a heated condition. Removal of the heat caused the mem-
brane to exceed the ultimate strength, whi. 11 led to the
failure;
8) The trap device installed in the fuel tank successfully
provides single phase liquid outflow in a negative 1 g
regime;
9) Nickel is a major cause of the corrosion of the 300
series stainless steels;
W
_A?
III-2
	
MCR-68-119 (Part II)
10) Anodic coatings of aluminum alloys insure a very
high degree of protection of these materials;
11) Tantalum, columbium, tungsten, and the ceramics were
unaffected by the N20 4 exposure at 135°C;
t
12) Liquid propulsion systems may be qualified for pla-
netary program usage without extending the state of the
art.
For
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of the work performed during this portion of the
t	 program the following recommendations can be made:
1) Future designs of Teflon diaphragms, bladders, and
other similar devices should provide for a line-to-line
wall contact with less than 1 percent inflation;
2) Further development should be carried out to deter-
mine the proper inspection criteria for the heating and
sealing of Teflon coated parts.
3) Aluminum seats, seals, and mechanical part^ usage in
a propulsion system using N20 4 is not recommended. High-
strength materials such as titanium should be incorporated
using a bellows-type stem seal;
4) The properties of Teflon in the presence of heated
nitrogen tetroxide should be more definitive;
5) Tantalum screens should be developed to provide capil-
lary devices for nitrogen tetroxide service in steriliza-
ble systems;
6) In conjunction with recommendation 5), welding devel-
opment programs should be initiated to provide the capa-
bility to weld dissimilar materials without forming incom-
patible products;
7) The regulator failure mode should be eliminated by
knurling the contact surfaces or providing contact lands
to reduce the surface area to prevent the stickUng. Addi-
tional tests should be performed to verify the corrective
action;
8) Because of the penalties associated with sterilization
of nitrogen tetroxide systems it is recommended a program
qualifying a sterile propellant transfer system be initia-
ted at once. This should include bio-assay monitoring to
assure program adequacy.
MCR-68-119 (Part II)
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V. TECHNICAL DISCUSSION
f,	 A. MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY EVALUATION
1. Background
A continued materials test program produced a number of inter-
esting and valuable results that will serve to broaden the tech-
nology developed in the first series of tests conducted in the
fourth quarter of 1966 and reported in the second Quarterly Report,
April 1967, and Part I of the final report, August 1968. Earlier
tests produced sufficient materials data to allow design and func-
tional operation of a sterilizable engine module loaded with pro-
pellants before heat sterilization. Materials tested in 1966 ex-
hibited varying degrees of resistance to N2O4 at 135°C after 600 hr.
A brief summary of those results are listed below:
1) Titanium alloy 6 Ai-4V possessed the highest degree of
resistance to the propellant. This alloy was used for
the propellant tanks;
2) All. structural aluminum alloys tested were found to
sustain both surface and intergranular attack (up to
4 mils deep) with production of finely divided alumi-
num nitrate salts;
3) The 300 series stainless steels were attacked both at
the surface and at grain boundaries to a depth of
about 0.004 in. This attack caused the formation of
massive quantities of a thick viscous amorphous product
that contained the same elements as the parent mate-
rial;
4) All high nickel alloys were attacked destructively and
produced large quantities of semiliquid corrosion pro-
ducts;
5) Teflon was lightly attacked with the production of a
white flock with no significant change in the physical
properties of the material.
The additional materials compatibility test specimens were se-
lected to evaluate a variety of basic alloys not considered pre-
viously and to determine whether protective coatings could be used
on materials subject to attack. Other considerations included
evaluation of ductile metals for screen devices and the importance
of nickel, as an alloying agent, on the corrosion resistance of
ferrous-based alloys.
V-2
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Anodizing is a commonly used practice for providing a corrosion
resistant coating on aluminum alloy products. The coating is ap-
plied by an electrolytic treatment of the base material in a con-
ductive acidic-aqueous bath that produces an adherent film of
aluminum oxide. The oxide is formed in usable thicknesses because
microscopic pores are present during the electrolytic oxidation
process that allows access of the electrolyte to the base metal.
After producing the coating, the pores must be sealed or the
protective capabilities of the coating would be seriously reduced.
Sealing is normally accomplished by immersing the product in 180
to 200°F water for 30 minutes. This treatment hydrates the alumi-
num oxide, thereby changing its structure and causing the pores to
close. One of the most commonly used tests for determining the
presence of an anodic film is electrical conductivity. Since alu-
minum oxide is a dielectric, the surface of the product will not
conduct if the coating is present. This test is rapid and con-
venient; however, it will not detect the lack of adequate sealing
because the pore size is too small for electrical probes to be
effective.
2. Test Setup
Test specimens were placed in 19-mm-diameter test tubes and
then inserted into a 1-in.-diameter aluminum tube assembly. The
tube was flared on each end and standard AN sleeves, nuts, and
plugs were used as closures. The propellant was first treated
with nitric oxide (NO) and then added to the test tube. The pro-
pellant was then allowed to flow into the bottom of the aluminum
tube to assure that at least 1/2 of the test specimen would be
immersed in the liquid after boiloff of sufficient liquid to sat-
isfy the vapor pressure demand at 135°C. Pressure was not measured
during the test.
3. Selection of Materials
Selection of candidate materials was primarily influenced by
four considerations: 1) 'Potential use for structural or special
design applications; 2) Potential improvement of the basic resis-
tance through application protective coatings; 3) Availability of
the material; 4) Novelty of the material as related to initial
testing.
Candidate materials were exposed to the propellant with two
types of specimens: (1) prestressed specimens using the stressed
configuration devised by NASA-Langley, and (2) unstressed speci-
mens. Stressed specimens were loaded to 757, of yield strength.
MCR-68-119 (Part II)	 1'-3
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Materials not stressed were tested in this manner because their
inherent physical properties or their available form was not con-
ducive to the preparation of the Langley type of stressed specimen.
Also, some of the nonstressed materials would be used in airborne
application as bearing or sealing surfaces and would never actually
be stressed except with a minor shear load or in compression.
The following materials were selected for continuing compati-
bility evaluation with N2O4 . Various groups of materials are pre-
sented and the reason for selecting each is discussed.
2021-T6 Aluminum, Chromic Acid Anodized, Stressed and
Unstressed
2014-T6 Aluminum, Chromic Acid Anodized, Stressed and
Unstressed
6061-T6 Aluminum, Chromic Acid Anodized, Stressed and
Unstressed
2021-T6 Aluminum, Sulfuric Acid Anodized, Stressed and
Unstressed
2014-T6 Aluminum, Sulfuric Acid Anodized, Stressed and
Unstressed
6061-T6 Aluminum, Sulfuric Acid Anodized, Stressed and
Unstressed
These alloys were tested during the early phases of this pro-
gram. They were found to be acceptable for structural applica-
tions; however, they were attacked and suffered a few mils of
intergranular corrosion and produced a small quantity of abrasive
corrosion products. Limited testing was conducted on specimens
that had been anodized. The Al203 coating seemed to afford a
certain degree of protection. This possibility was pursued in
the extension of the program. The alloys selected all possessed
good structural strength and were considered typical of those that
would be selected by the designer. Both chromic acid and sulfuric
acid anodizing processes were tested because of the chemical, phys-
ical, and thickness differences of the coatings and the design re-
striction related to retaining residual sulfuric acid anodizing
electrolyte in assembled units.
2024-T3 1 Clad, Not Stressed
2024-T3, Bare, Not Stressed
r	 ^
^r
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The primary purpose of this test was to ascertain the degree
of protection afforded by the cladding of nearly pure aluminum on
a high copper structural alloy. Previous tests with 1100-0 alumi-
num indicated that this type of material possessed greater corro-
sion resistance than the highly alloyed materials. The clad mate-
rials do not lend themselves to fusion welding, except when the
cladding is removed in the weld zone. However if sufficient design
margins were maintained in the major weld portion of the tankage,
the small amount of attack and resultant corrosion products in the
weld area might be acceptable.
430 Stainless Steel Alloy, Stressed and Unstressed
During the initial phase of testing, only 300 series alloys
were tested because of their prominence in the construction of
N204 propellant systems. Test results indicated that the high
nickel content of these alloys was responsible for the creation
of the amorphous, sticky substance as a corrosion product. The
430 alloy was selected as a representative sample of the 400 series
stainless steels having low nickel content.
321 Stainless Steel, Chromium Plated, Stressed
This alloy exhibited properties of noncompatibility typical of
all of the 300 series alloys. Since the! presence of nickel in the
alloy was considered the major cause of the corrosion product for-
mation, a protective coating of 2 mils of chromium was applied.
It was expected that a minor degree of attack would be sustained.
Titanium Alloy, 5A, - 2.5 Sn, Stressed and Unstressed
Titanium Alloy, 8M - 1Mo, Stressed and Unstressed
These materials were included since only 6A.8-4V was tested
during the initial phase. This selection was intended to give the
designer and manufacturing engineer a greater latitude in material
selection.
Tantalum Sheet, Not Stressed
Unalloyed tantalum is extremely ductile and does not lend it-
self to stressed specimens. One of its primary uses, in commercial
chemical applications, is in heating systems that must be exposed
to hot acids. This material was tested as a possible source of
screen material for a positive displacement device in low-gravity
propulsion systems. Since it is extremely ductile, it could be
easily drawn into wires and woven into screens.
MCR-68-119 (Part II)
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Aluminum Oxide Ceramic
Beryllium Oxide Ceramic
Both of these materials will be completely unaffected by the
N204 at 135°C. However, since no ceramics were tested earlier,
and since a number of surprises have occurred, these materials
were selected for test. Their potential use would be in close
tolerance hard seats, sliding unit guides, or in drive mechanism
subjected to compressive loading.
6061 Aluminum Screen, Chromic Acid Anodized
6061 Aluminum Screen, Sulfuric Acid Anodized
These materials were given further consideration for applica-
tion as a positive displacement device in zero gravity. The pur-
pose of the protective anodic coating was explained previously.
Beryllium, Not Stressed
Available samples of this material were such that the stressed
specimen were not practical. The basic resistance to N 204i at any
temperature was questionable. Before loading the sample into a
test vessel, it was subjected to exposure to N 204 at room tempera-
ture for 24 hr. No reaction was noted and it was accepted as a
good test material. Although beryllium is difficult to fabricate,
it possesses structural properties of interest to the designer.
It is lighter and stronger than aluminum and has a modulus of
elasticity of 40 million.
Tungsten, W-2, Not Stressed
This material is extremely brittle and does not lend itself to
the Langley type of stressed specimen. It will withstand extremely
high temperatures and possesses excellent resistance to wear by
abrasion. Its application in an engine module would be in areas
where a high degree of abrasion would occur or where high tempera-
tures are expected. Because of its brittleness, structural appli-
cations should be made where loading is primarily compressive.
Cobalt (L605), Stressed and Unstressed
This alloy is a high chromic-nickel cobalt-based alloy con-
.	 taining 15% tungsten. Its primary aerospace use is in construction
of hardware that will be exposed to high temperatures, e.g., the
engine compartment. This alloy could have application in engine
i
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components that would be exposed to the propellant during dry heat
sterilization and exposed to high temperatures during engine fir-
ing. If found compatible, cobalt could also replace hardware for
general propulsion tankage construction as a substitute for the 300
•
series stainless steels.
Columbium Alloy DP-14
Columbium Alloy C B752, Stressed and Unstressed
These alloys are low strength, highly ductile materials that
exhibit a high degree of resistance to nitric acid. They could
be easily woven into screens for use in positive displacement as-
semblies for low-gravity propellant expulsion.
AMS 5538 - Cyclops, Stressed and Unstressed
This is a precipitation hardened stainless steel which exhibits
high strength in the annealed condition, i.e., 65,000 YTS and
120,000 UTS. It could serve in a variety of structural applica-
tions for tankage, tubing, and components. It also possesses good
structural properties at high temperatures.
HY-140 Steel Plate, Not Stressed
This material was not stressed because its available form was
plate and was not practical for use as a Langley-type specimen.
It is a low alloyed high-strength steel that retains almost 100%
of its strength in weld areas. It has a 140,000 psi YTS and excel-
lent fracture toughness. HY-140 is currently being given consider-
ation as a structural material for tankage for new USAF weapon
systems.
Austenitic Stainless Steel Alloy 21-6-9, Stressed and Un-
Stressed
This is a high chromium content (21%), high manganese (9%)
a	 stainless steel alloy. It has high strength in the annealed con-
dition and can be strain hardened to 180,000 psi YTS. It would
be an excellent structural material for propulsion tanks, liners,
and fittings. It has good welding and forming characteristics.
TZM Titanium-Zirconium-Molybdenum Alloy
This material is a molybdenum based alloy containing titanium
and zirconium. Its normal use is in high temperature structures.
}Rt ^1
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4. Test Results
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The general results of the materials exposure may be summarized
as follows:
1) Anodic coating of aluminum alloys can ensure almost
100% protection to these materials;
21 Commercially pure aluminum cladding of structural alu-
minum alloys provides 100% protection with a very slight
amount of corrosion products formed. The formation of
corrosion products was so small the material may be
classified as compatible;
3) Tantallum and columbium were unatfacted by the propel-
lant. Both of these materials are highly ductile and
would be capable of producing high quality screens for
positive displacement devices;
4) Chromium plating stainless steels afford excellent pro-
tection to the base material although only 321 stain-
less steel was tested. This protection could be af-
forded to any metallic material;
5) L-605 cobalt alloy sustained weld surface attack and
may be considered marginally compatible. It in no way
resembled the poor corrosion resistance of the high
nickel ferrous alloys;
Table V-1 presents the compatibility results in summary form
for easy reference.
Comments on the individual material specimens present the de-
tailed observations. Where appropriate, photomicrographs were
examined to aid in the specimen evaluation..
a. Aluminums
2014-T6 Aluminum, Anodized with Chromic Acid - No observ-
able attack. Anodic coating was intact, as determined by electri-
cal measurements which showed that the surface of the specimen was
not conductive. Figure V-1 shows a photomicrograph that is repre-
sentative of the degree of protection afforded aluminum by the
anodic coating produced by chromic acid.
2014-T6 Aluminum Anodized with Sulfuric Acid - No observ-
able attack. Anodic coating was intact as determined by electri-
cal testing. Figure V-2 is a photomicrograph that demonstrates
the protection afforded.
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Table V-1 Materials Compatibility Exposed to N204 at 135°C
for 600 Hours
Material Results*
1. 2014-T6 Aluminum, Chromic Acid Anodized C
2. 2014-T6 Aluminum, Sulfuric Acid Anodized C
3. 6061-T6 Aluminum, Chromic Acid Anodized C
4. 6061-T6 Aluminum, Sulfuric Acid Anodized C
5. 2021-T6 Aluminum, Chromic Acid Anodized N/A
6. 2021-T6 Aluminum, Sulfuric Acid Anodized C
7. 6061 Aluminum, Screen Chromic Acid Anodized C
8. 6061 Aluminum, Screen Sulfuric Acid Anodized N/A
9. 2024-T3 Aluminum, Pure Aluminum Clad C
10. 2024-T3 Aluminum, Clad Stripped NC
11. 430 Stainless Steel C
12. 321 Stainless Steel, Chrome Plated MC
13. AMS 5538 Stainless Steel MC
14. 21-6-9 Stainless Steel MC
15. HY-140 Steel C
16. Titanium 5A8-2.5 Sn C
17. Titanium 8A8-1 Mo C
18. Beryllium C
19. Columbium DP14 C
20. Columbium C B752 C
21. Tantalum, Pure
22. Tungsten,	 Pure C
23. TZM Titanium-Zirconium-Molybdenum MC
24. L-605 Cobalt MC
25. Beryllium Oxide Ceramic C
26. Aluminum Oxide Ceramic C
*C - compatible; MC - marginally compatible; NC - not
compatible; and N/A - not available, specimen improperly
prepared.
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(a) Chromic Acid Anodized 
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te: No attack is noted on the chromic acid anodized aluminum.
Fig, V-1 Aluminum (2014-T6) after Exposure to N204 for 600 Hours at 135 °C (200x)
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(a) Sulfuric Acid Anodize
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(b) Bare Metal
Note: No attack is noted on the sulfuric acid anodized aluminum.
Fig. V-2 Aluminum (2014-T6) after Exposure to N204
 for 600 Hours at 135°C (200x)
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6061-T6 Aluminum Anodized with Chromic Acid - No observable
attack. Anodic coating was intact.
6061-T6 Aluminum Anodized with Sulfuric Acid - No observ-
r	 able attack. Anodic coating was intact.
2021-T6 Aluminum Anodized with Chromic Acid - This specimen
and the glass container had a light coating of an extremely fine,
white powder. This indicated that a minute amount of the aluminum
base material had been removed. Although the anodic coating was
found to have remained (this was determined by conductivity meas-
urements) it appears that the hot water seal was inadequate. This
seal is performed subsequent to anodizing in order to close the
pores formed during the process through hydration of the oxide
film. It also points out the importance of an adequate seal for
complete protection of the base metal. Since this did not occur
with the other wrought alloy specimens, it may be concluded that
inadequate processing was the cause of the attack.
2021-T6 Aluminum Anodized with Sulfuric Acid - No observ-
able attack. Anodic coating was intact.
6061 Aluminum Screen Anodized with Chromic Acid - No ob-
servable attack was found. Anodic coating was intact. See Fig.
V-3 for a microsection of this specimen.
6_061 Aluminum Screen Anodized with Sulfuric Acid - A light,
powdery residue was found on the specimen and in the glass con-
tainer indicating the same type of attack and incomplete processing
as was found with the chromic acid anodized 2021-T6 wrought sample.
Here again, the surface was not electrically conductive.
2024-T3 Aluminum with a Commercially Pure Aluminum Clad -
Degree of attack was not significant. A minute amount of an ex-
ternally fine powder was on the specimen surface. Figure V-4
demonstrates the low degree of attack and the lack of any penetra-
tion of the cladding.
2024-T3 Aluminum with Cladding Stripped before Test_ - Re-
acted typically of highly alloyed, unprotected aluminum structural
•	 alloys. This resulted in intergranular attack and formation of
corrosion products.
w(a) 6061 Alloy Chromic Acid Anodized
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Note: The chromic acid anodized specimen sustained no attack.
Fig. V-3 Aluminum Screen aster Exposure to N 204 for 600 Hours at 135°C (200x)
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Note: Surface is free of pits; there was no penetration of the clad coating
Fig. V-4 Aluminum (2024-T3) Clad with Pure Aluminum after Exposure
to N204 for 600 Hours at 135°C (200x)
rn
ao
r+
b
m
rt
rt
HHv
i
w
V-14
	
MCR-68-119 (Part II)
b. Steels - Stainless steels were tested further. As may be
seen in the results of initial tests conducted during this contract,
all candidate 300 series stainless steels were found to be unac-
ceptable for use in the specified environment because of the for-
mation of large quantities of a thick, viscous material. Chemical
assay of this product showed that its elemental composition was
the same as that of the test specimen. The presence of a rela-
tively high nickel content was suspected to cause the reaction.
This series of tests were conducted to gain additional data related
to the nickel content effect, the value of a protective coating,
and to stainless steels other than the common 300 series alloys
tested during the initial phase of this contract. Results are as
follows.
430) Stainless Steel - This alloy sustained a minor degree
of attack that resulted in superficial darkening of the specimen
surface. There was no formation of any of the viscous corrosion
product or of intergranular corrosion that was typical of the 300
series alloys. The surface darkening was primarily found in areas
that were freshly sheared or had recently been shot peened. Since
the specimen had been passivated before specimen preparation, and
not after, this indicates that the specimen was more active in the
freshly worked areas. Photomicrographs were taken of a passivated
surface (Fig. V-5) and a shot peened surface (Fig. V-6). As may
be seen, no observable chemical attack existed on either area. The
rougher appearance of Fig. V-6 is the result of the shot peening.
This alloy may, for all practical purposes, be considered inert to
the propellant sterilization environment.
321 Stainless Steel, Chromium Plated - A light attack was
sustained with resultant formation of a minute amount of viscous
corrosion product. The amount of the product formed was less than
1% of that formed when bare 321 stainless steel was exposed to
{	 N204 during the sterilization cycle. Ordinarily, chromium plating
MM
	
	
is a poor protective coating against corrosion because of micro-
scopic porosity ir.:erent to this coating. This porosity apparently
allowed the small degree of attack to take place. There are pro-
prietary processes available which produce a crack-free chromium
plating. Application of this type of coating could be of signifi-
cant value in protecting the 300 series stainless steel alloys.
Figure V-7 illustrates the degree of protection provided by the
standard plating process.
i
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Fig. V-5 430 Stainless Steel Passivated
Surface
Fig. V-6 430 Stainless Steel Freshly Peened
Surface
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Note: There was no evidence of intergranular attack or pitting in either photograph.
Surface roughness shown in Fig. V-6 was the result of shot peening.
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The chrome plated specimen was not attacked.	 The plating is shown
as a dark surface in Fig. V-7 (a).
(a) Chrome Plated (h) Bare Metal
C
rn
Fig. V-7 Stainless Steel (321 series) after Exposure to N204
 for 600 Hours at 135°C (200x)
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AMS 5538 Cyclops, Stainless Steel Alloy - Surface attack
was noted with resultant formation of a few beads of the viscous
corrosion product and a general roughening of the specimen surface.
This material was affected much less than were the bare 300 series
alloys. Figure V-8 illustrates the degree of attack.
21-6-9 Stainless Steel Alloy - Surface attack was sustained
with formation of a few beads of the typical corrosion product.
This material reacted in a manner similar to that of AMS 5538.
Figure V-9 illustrates the minor degree of attack as well of the
lack of significant intergranular corrosion.
HY-140 MY represents high yield strength of 140 ksi) -
To further pursue the idea that nickel may be a major contributor
to the attack on ferrous alloys, a low alloyed material possessing
excellent structural properties was tested. This specimen was
polished to a mirror finish before the test. On removal from the
propellant, this finish was unaffected. HY-140 demonstrated greater
corrosion resistance than 6AX-4V titanium or any ferrous based alloy
tested.
C. Titaniums - Since the 6A8-4V titanium had exhibited supe-
rior corrosion resistance to that of any alloy tested in the first
series of this contract, it was determined that additional repre-
sentative alloys of titanium be evaluated to establish whether this
characteristic was typical of titanium. Results were as follows.
5A2-2.5Sn Titanium Alloy - Light surface attack was found
with the formation of an iridescent film that is typical of that
formed on 6A2-4V titanium. Both alloys are considered comparable
in resistance to attack by the propellant. Figure V-10 demon-
strates this alloy's high degree of compatibility.
8A,8-lMo Titanium Alloy - This alloy reacted identically as
that of 5A8-2.5Sn.
d. Miscellaneous Materials - Another series of materials were
selected for test because they were unique in relation to those
previously tested. Results were as follows.
Beryllium - This metal was completely unaffected by the
propellant. Initially, it was suspected that its exposure to N204
might cause a sufficient rate of reaction that extreme pressure
would result in a closed vessel. Therefore, preliminary testing
was conducted in an open beaker containing 100 cc of N 204 and about
1 cu in. of beryllium. This test container was allowed to vent in
contact with air until all the propellant had evaporated (about 3
hr). No reaction was noted. This material may be considered in-
ert to the propellant.
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Note: Surface attack is evidenced by small pits. No significant intergranular attack is apparent.
Fig. V-8 Stainless Steel (AMS 5538) after Exposure to N 204 for 600 Hours at 135 0C (200x)
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Note: Surface is roughened by pitting. Some intergranular corrosion is observable.
Structural strength not affected,
Fig, V-9 Stainless Steel (21-6-9) after Exposure to N204
 for 600 Hours at 135°C (200x)
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(b) 6 AX -4V Alloy
1
(a) 5M-2.5 Sn Alloy
Note: No evidence of attack of either alloy.
Fig. V-10 Titanium Alloys after Exposure to N204
 for 600 flours at 135°C (200x)
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Columbium Alloy, DP14 - Light surface attack with attendant
•	 discoloration was noted. No loose corrosion products were formed.
Figure V-11 illustrates the degree of corrosion resistance that
this alloy possesses.
Columbium Alloy C B752 - This alloy reacted identically as
the DP14 discussed above.
Tantallum, Commercially Pure - No attack occurred. Tantal-
lum is inert to the propellant.
Tungsten, Commercially Pure - No attack occurred.
TZM (Titanium-Zirconium-Molybdenum) - A light surface at-
tack with the formation of smut and some surface roughing was ob-
served.
L-605 Cobalt Super Alloy - Surface attack with formation
of a white, loo6ely adherent corrosion product was noted. This
alloy was tested, primarily because of its chemical similarity
to nickel. Resultant corrosion products indicated cobalt behaves
considerably different than nickel in the sterilization environ-
ment with N204 . Figure V-12 shows a photomicrograph of this ma-
terial's surface after testing.
Beryllium Oxide Ceramic - This material sustained no chem-
ical attack and no increase in weight as the result of absorption.
It is inert to the propellant.
w
Aluminum Oxide Ceramic - This material sustained no chemi-
cal attack and no increase in weight as the result of absorption.
It is inert to the propellant.
5. Long-Term Storage Testing
Part I of the final report presents the results of the fuel
tank storage tests after one year ambient exposure after sterili-
zation. There was no degradation of the fuel or the materials.
Similarly, the oxidizer tanks tests showed no significant attack
on any of the materials of construction and the TFE/FEP laminate
material suffered no degradation. The oxidizer tanks had been
stored for 13 months at ambient conditions after being exposed
to 600 hr of heat sterilization.
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Note: No evidence of surface attack or intergranular corrosion observable.
The light attack seen during surface examination was too small to
be seen at 200x magnification.
Fig. V-11 Columbium (DP14) after Exposure to
N204 for 600 Hours at 135 0C (200x)
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Note: Some minute pitting of the surface is in evidence.
No intergranular corrosion occurred.
Fig. V-12 Cobalt (L-605) after Exposure to
N2 04 for 600 Hours at 135 0C (200x)
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B. SYSTEM DESIGN MODIFICATIONS
1. Oxidizer Tank and Diaphragm
a. Description of Changes - Examination of the oxidizer tank
following the initial module firing revealed a rupture of the
Teflon expulsion diaphragm. The overexpulsion was due to the par-
ticular design of diaphragm installation. This design required
that the diaphragm be mounted 0.8 in. off center to prevent dam-
age to the diaphragm when making the final girth weld of the tank
hemispheres (see Fig. V-13). As a result of this installation
the diaphragm did not touch the wall of the lower hemisphere when
folded through during a normal expulsion cycle.
Detailed procedures were generated to provide for propel-
lant filling and handling of the tank so that the diaphragm was
never folded through to the expelled position inadvertantly or
that a pressure differential in excess of 1 psi was never gene-
rated across the diaphragm.
In spite of these precautions the diaphragm in the module
was ruptured because of overexpulsion and a spare diaphragm was
destroyed in a similar manner when undergoing cycle tests as part
of another program. Because of this activity, changes were made
to the design to prevent the reoccurrence of this failure.
The resulting design configuration to the oxidizer tank
is shown in Fig. V-14. It provides for a centerline installation
of the diaphragm. In this way, with proper sizing of tank and
diaphragm, a line-to-line contact can be made between the dia-
phragm and the tank wall in either the fully loaded or the fully
expelled position.
Several changes were made in the diaphragm design when the
diaphragms were reordered. The most significant change was a
resizing of the diaphragm to prevent the apparent oversize found
on the initial order. The diaphragm had to be squeezed in on the
initial assembly by approximately 0.125 in. This resulted in
lines of "mud cracking" when examined following sterilization.
To overcome this the size of the diaphragm was reduced by 2%,
allowing the unit to stretch into position when exposed to the
high temperature and vapor pressure experienced during sterili-
zation. As a result the radius of the diaphragm was reduced to
8.085 in., allowing for a 0.165-in. stretch.
i	 MCR-68-119 (Part II)
izer Tank, Original Seal Joint Design
aphragm
,-line of Tank
Tank Inside Wall
Girth Weld
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Fig. V-14 Oxidizer Tank Diaphragm Retainer Redesigned
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Two other changes were made in the design. The apex
doubler was reduced in thickness from 0.035 in. to 0.020 in.,
maximum, and the method of formation was changed. Originally a
doubler was fused in place while the new design called for ad-
ditional sprays of Teflon FEP on the outside surface. This
change was incorporated to eliminate the relaxation of the inte-
gral doubler that resulted in a highly stressed area and leak in
the original component test.
A minor change was made in the coating material of the
flange ring by substituting a codispersion Teflon for the TFE/
FEP laminate. This change provided for better process control
of the coating application. Figure V-15 shows the diaphragm in
the approved configuration.
b. Fabrication and Assembly
Diaphragms - During the fabrication of the diaphragms
some difficulty was experienced in obtaining a heat fusion of the
membrane to the flange ring. The ring was coated with codisper-
sion Teflon with a thin coating of FEP applied as the final spray
on the bottom of the ring. This was to provide a positive heat
seal between, the codispersion ring and the laminated membrane.
The sealing of the first diaphragm was extremely difficult and
the heat sealing operation was repeated several times before a
leaktight seal was obtained. Some blistering of the seal area
was eviaent. mere was no estaDli.snea crir.eria ror the inspec-
tion and acceptance of the heat seal area. As a result s the dia-
phragms were shipped to Denver so that the heat seal area could
be reworked by hand stoning the surfaces for a smoother finish.
Table V-2 presents the data before and after rework. The draw-
ing value for the total flange thickness was 0.110 to 0.112 in.
The delivered and reworked units were slightly thicker than this
value; therefore some unevenness could be accepted and still ef-
fect a good seal. On the basis of these results S/N 102 was as-
signed ;.o the module build and S/N 101 was assigned to the com-
ponent tank. Figure V-16 is a photograph of the seal area blis-
tering. As explained later this seal provided an effective seal.
•
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Cross Section A
Note: All dimensions in inches.
5.00 Maximum Transition
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3.00 Diameter
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Fig. V-15 Oxidizer Tank Diaphragm Design
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Table V-2 Diaphragm Rim Thickness
S/N 101 S/N 102
As Received After Rework As Received After ReworkStation
1 0.1145 0.1145 0.115 0.114
2 0.116 0.115 0.114 0.113
3 0.116 0.115 0.1145 0.114
4 0.1155 0.115 0.115 0.114
5 0.117 0.1155 0.114 0.114
6 0.1152 0.115 0.115 0.114
7 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.114
8 0.1145 0.1145 0.11.55 0.114
9 0.1155 0.115 0.1165 0.114
10 0.1148 0.1148 0.1163 0.114
11 0.114 0.114 0.1163 0.114
12 0.1145 0.1145 0.115 0.114
13 0.1142 0.1142 0.112 0.112
14 0.1152 0.115 0.113 0.113
15 0.1155 0.115 0.1138 0.1135
16 0.116 0.1155 0.114 0.114
17 0.1155 0.115 i	 0.115 I	 0.114
18 0.117 0.1155 i	 0.116 0.114
19 0.1162 0.1155 0.116 0.114
20 0.1152 0.1152 0.116 0.114
21 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.114
Max. 0.117 0.1155 0.1165 0.114
Min. 0.114 0.114 0.112 0.112
0MCR-68-119 (Part II)V-30
0
k
Fig. V-16 Diaphragm Seal
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_Oxidizer Tanks - During the final assembly of the oxidiz-
er tanks a major problem was encountered. The Teflon diaphragm
to be installed inside the oxidizer tank was purposely designed
2% undersize as described above. When the final steps were taken
to seat the diaphragm inside the hemisphere wal the diaphragm
took a permanent set so that the minimum section thickness was
less than one-third its original value. When the remaining dia-
phragm was installed in the tank in a heated condition, it sur-
vived the initial stretching operations and beak check; however,
preliminary checks before formal acceptance testing indicated a
severe 'Leak in the diaphragm. Subsequent tank disassembly showed
the substituted unit had a small hole approximately 1/16 in. in
its greatest dimension.
The failure was characterized by stretching of the dia-
phragm around approximately 75% of the circumference as indicated
by a white streak. In the one case a small hole developed, while
in the original unit a hole did not develop. Figure V-17 shows
the general arrangement of the propellant tank weld area, and the
point of failure of the diaphragm. The photographs of the fail-
ures a •e shown in Fig. V-18. The assembly steps leading to the
failure of both diaphragms are described in the following para-
graphs.
Diaphragm S/N 102 was selected for assembly into the sys-
tem tank, or module tank because the flange-to-membrane seal ap-
peared to be in a better condition. The diaphragm was placed in
the upper tank hemisphere and fitted with the retainer ring to
hold it in place. This provided a vacuumtight seal. A vacuum
was then drawn behind the diaphragm to stretch it into place.
When a vacuum of 20 in. Hg was reached the diaphragm began to
stretch beyond the elastic limit around the girth area as indi-
cated by a white coloration.
The assembly process was immediately stopped and the dia-
phragm removed. The wall thickness of the Teflon diaphragm was
determined to be 0,003 in. as compared to the nominal figure of
0.010 in.
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Fig. V-17 Oxidizer Tank Diaphragm Failure 	
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Fig. V-18 Oxidizer Diaphragm Failure Area
A conference was held with the diaphragm vendor, Dilectrix
Corporation of Farmingdale, N. Y. During that conference it was
suggested that the remaining diaphragm be heated in the upper dome
area of the diaphragm to induce a uniform stretch into the tank
hemisphere. The vendor's experience with this type of a diaphragm
configuration indicated that a stretch up to 41% at room tempera-
ture had been obtained. With this knowledge plus the application
of heat to the tank wall there was every reason to believe the
second diaphragm, S/N 101, would be satisfactory. The diaphragm
and tank walls were heated with a hot air gun to approximately
160 to 180°F. The lower half was then assembled and clamped into
position. Sufficient force was applied to draw the tank halves
to a gap distance of 0.010 in. for welding.
Vacuum was then applied to the upper hemisphere that was
at the elevated temperature. A pumping rate of 0.5 in. Hg per
minute was obtained and the vacuum :successfully reached 29.5 Hg.
The tank was then isolated by closing the in-lane valves and the
pump removed and the system capped. The tank isolation valve was
then reopened and the pressure reading dropped from 29.5 in. to
6 in. Hg. It was then observed for 10 minutes and the readings
held steady indicating no leak in the tank either at the girth
seal or through diaphragm membrane. The vacuum system was then
reinstalled and 29.5 in. Hg vacuum was reestablished.
The tank was then installed in the small vacuum chamber
and the girth area was tacked welded to assure no degradation of
the seal. When this tack welding operation was complete a dif-
ferential pressure had been on the diaphragm for 3 hr. The tank
was then installed in the large automatic welding chamber with
both ands uncapped. The pressure was reduced to a hard vacuum
in approximately 1 hr.
Normal weld procedures were then implemented. Weld X-ray
were examined carefully and there was no evidence of any weld
porosity and the weld was judged successful.
Preliminary leak checks were then attempted before deliv-
ery to Wyle Laboratories for formal acceptance tests. The leak
check way performed with gaseous nitrogen and an unrestrained flow
was developed indicating a severe leak.
When the leak was discovered the tank was filled with al-
cohol until the level of the leak was determined. Before and af-
ter weight determinations showed the leak was in the girth area.
The tank was then cut open for examination. The condition of the
failure is shown in Fig. V-18 at lOx magnification.
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Dimensional Checks - A review of the various pertinent
•	 dimensions was made following the failures of the diaphragms.
Figure V-15 shows the outline of the diaphragm and the applicable
dimensions. The basic tank radius was checked and determined to
be 8.250 in. and within the required tolerances. The diaphragms
were measured and the results are shown in Table V-3.
Table V-3 Diaphragm Radius
0
Diaphragm
Radius	 (in.)
Relaxed Inflated Required
SIN 101
SIN 102
7.985
7.950
8.080
8.078
8.080 t 0.005
8.080 t 0.005
The diaphragm acceptance test plan allows an inflation
pressure of 0.4 t 0.1 psi to provide a stable membrane for the
dimensional checks. Table V-3 shows, before the failure, than
an inflations pressure of 0.4 psi causes an increase in radius
of 0.128 in. reflecting some degradation due to the failure and
approaching 2% of the basic dimension.
The following conclusions can be made regarding the dia-
phragms:
The inflation pressure for reference dimensional checks
imposes a stretch of 1.5% on the membrane radius;
Providing an additional stretch from this reference of
2% led to the failure of both diaphragms;
While the application of heat allowed diaphragm SIN 101
to stretch, continued application of the driving pres-
sure force after removal of the heat caused the diaphragm
to rupture;
A design approach that provides line-to-line contact of
the diaphragm and the tank wall within the 1.5% stretch
of the 0.4 psi inflation pressure should be adopted.
•
	
	
The following corrective action was initiated. Two new
diaphragms were ordered incorporating the design approach de-
scribed above. Final tank dimensional adjustments were made to
_	 accomodate the affect of cutting the tanks apart. The diaphragms
were resized so that a line-to-line contact with the tank wall
was achieved. The final dimension was 8.20 in. in radius, which
resulted in no more than 1% stretch of the diaphragm from the re-
laxed condition.
^, r
MCR-68-119 (Part II)V-36
r
As a result of the diaphragm leakage and subsequent open-
ing of the tank some material was lost. To build identical dia-
phragms it was necessary to reduce the height of both propellant
tanks as dictated by the module tank drawing LAB 6002514-89. The
tanks had to be remachined in preparation for rewelding. The -89
tank was reduced 0.155 in. and the tank LAB 6002514-109 was re-
duced 0.150 in. A fit check of the diaphragms in each tank was
satisfactory. The diaphragms in the relaxed condition barely
touched the hemispherical wall, which meant the line-to-line con-
tact would be established with less than a 1% stretch.
New fixturing was provided for the tank assembly at this
time. The fixtures were heavy duty rings with through bolts that
provided assembly of the tanks with the necessary preload to seat
the diaphragm ring seal. It also made it possible to make seal
leak checks before welding so that repairs could be made if neces-
sary without the expense of cutting the welded tanks apart. Pre-
liminary checks were made before welding with GN 2 and it was es-
tablished that no leaks occurred at the test pressure of 1 psig.
Both tanks were welded without incident and acceptance
tested. During the acceptance testing there was no external leak-
age or deformation at the proof pressure of 2050 psig.
Some procedural difficulties were experienced in perform-
ing the internal diaphragm leakage tests. When the diaphragm is
in a relaxed condition at ambient pressure some air is trapped
inside the tank. When the diaphragm is pressurized to 1 psig on
the liquid side, the air on the pressurization side must escape.
This may be interpreted as leakage by the uninitiated operator.
The escape rate gradually lowers to a rate that may be interpreted
as a permeation rate. If the rate remains high it can be inter-
preted as internal leakage. Not enough data are available to es-
tablish a convincing permeation rate for the various Teflon lam-
inates. Calculations for the geometry of this diaphragm would in-
dicate a helium permeation rate of 15 ml/hr. This assumes a rate
of 0.17 ml/in. 2 -hr-psi-mil obtained from private conversations
with Howard Stanford of JPL. This rate was experimental data for
FEP Teflon from DuPont. The module tank (-89) leakage was re-
corded as 5 bubbles of helium in 42 seconds when exposed to the es-
tablished acceptance test. The tank was returned to the vendor
(Pressure System Incorporated) (PSI) where the diaphragm was cy-
cled to an internal pressure of 100 psi and retested with nitro-
gen. The final rate was 0.165 ml/hr. This compares to a calcu-
lated permeation rate for nitrogen of 0.15 ml/hr from the same
reference noted above. The component tank (-109) leakage was re-
corded as 0.6 ml/min before proof test and 1.3 ml/min after proof
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test. This compared to 3.8 ml/min on the initial delivery in
1967. Therefore the same acceptance rationale prevails. The
leakage rate is not detrimental to the firing time and the al-
ternatives were too costly to consider. Therefore both tanks
were accepted.
2. Fuel Tank
a. Description of Changes - During the earlier component
testing performed as part of the original work statement thel
fuel tank screen trap did not perform properly under -1 g condi-
tions. Single phase outflow of propellant was not established.
In every attempt a severe entrainment of bubbles was experienced.
A failure analysis was initiated to investigate two po-
tential causes for the two-phase flow. Consideration was given
to leakage tests and dimensional checks and a trap was installed
in a transparent test fixture to visually observe the flow pheno-
mena. Both the leakage and dimensional checks as well as the
visual observations were helpful in establishing the cause of
two-phase flow.
The bubbles were observed flowing through the attachment
area between the titanium ring and the steel body. The joint is
formed by a ring of rivets that wEre leaktight through the joint;
however, the leak path was between the surfaces shown by the ar-
row in Fig. V-19. This series of tests clearly showed bubbles
emerging from the ring area resulting in a well established two-
phase flow. Sealing the joint with putty resulted in the desired
single-phase flow.
Earlier investigations of the dimensional configurations,
leakage, and computed pressure drops were also fruitful. Leak
check data revealed the trap in the component propellant tank
broke down at 1.5 in. H2 O. This leakage was through the rivet
holes at the bottom of the trap. Careful examination and measure-
ment of the as-built condition revealed that the clearances be-
tween the shoulder of the trap and the tank wall would develop a
pressure drop in excess of 1.5 in. H 2O at system rated flow.
Figure V-20 shows the trap installation into the propellant tank.
A parallel effort was started that would lead to the pro-
per design changes for the trap and rebuild schedule for the fuel
tank assembly. The trap was modified to eliminate the rivets at
the bottom of the trap and provide a greater flow clearance at
the shoulder of the tra p . This reduced the flow pressure drop
in this area to 0.127 in. H2O and further eliminated the potential
leak path through the rivet holes.
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While the new trap was being built, a search was initiated
to find a compatible method of :sealing the titanium to stainless
steel surface at the rivet diameter. First, metallic type seal-
ants, such as soft solders and brazes, were considered. The low
temperature solders and brazes, up to 1200°F, were discarded be-
cause the fluxes necessary to wet the titanium might cause the
fuel to decompose. One high temperature braze of gold-nickel
could be accomplished, but this would require: a brazing tempera-
ture of approximately 1800°F. This high a temperature might cause
the rivets to loosen or the screen to degrade, a risk that was not
attractive. Therefore the metallic sealants were discarded from
further consideration, and attention was focused on the nonmetal-
lic sealants. The nonmetallic seaiants had to be te.-..:ed to prove
sealing ability and compatibility with the fuel (MMH) at the
sterilizing temperature of 135°C.
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pig. V-20 Fuel Tank Trap Installation
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A series of candiate sealants were tested for qualifica-
tion. The tests were:
Initial tests at room temperature in monomethyl hydrazine;
Sample joints were made to test for leak tightness before 	 •
and after fuel exposure;
Exposure of the sealed joints in fuel at 135% for 114 hr.
Table V-4 presents the candidate materials and the results of the
testing.
Table V-4 Results of Nonmetallic Seal Exposure in
Monomethyl Hydrazine
^: t
Material
Room Temperature
Tests,	 72 hr 135°C,	 114 hr
Locktile, grade H OK Lost Adhesion
Silicone Sealant Lost Adhesiveness,
DISK-138 Eliminated from --
Further Testing
Clear Seal (GE Flex- Maintained Seal, Ex-
ible Adhesive of OK cess Bead Lost All
Translucent Silicone Adhesion
Rubber)
Elasto-Coat No. Lost Adhesiveness,
1-2020 (Chemical Eliminated from
Milling Mask Manu- Further Testing
factured by Organo-
Ce rams Inc.)
Water Glass, Sodium Good Hard Bead, No
Meta-Silicate:	 NA20 OK Leakage
X Si0 2	(x = 2 - 5)
Dow Corning DC-11 Dissolved, Seal De-
Grease
OK
stroyed
During the initial testing certain results were clouded
because of inadequate cleaning procedures. All subsequent test
specimens were cleaned as follows:
Trisodium phosphate bath (20 minutes);
Water rinse;
Immerse in Turco deoxidizing solution (15 minutes);
Plug (AP.) 0.0005 to 0.002 in.
Radial Clearances,
'c ,
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Water rinse;
Quick dip in nitric acid + HF;
Rinse in demineralized water;
Dry.
The joints made up for the final immersion in hot MMH were
fabricated as shown in Fig. V-21. All the sealants were set aside
for 24 hr to Provide a room temperature cure. All the joints ex-
cept the DC-11 were leak tested to 3 psi. The .joints were then
placed in bombs, loaded to a 30% ullage with MMH, sealed, and
placed in a bath at 135°C. Pressures rose no higher than 88 psia,
which compares favorably to the normal vapor pressure of 63 psia.
Pressures were checked at 24 and 48 hr, and finally at the conclu-
sion of the test at 114 hr. No significant change occurred indicat-
ing that none of the materials caused decomposition of the fuel.
Sealant
Application
	 5/8 in. Tubing (Ak)
u
Fig. V-21 Test Joint
To assure that the available trap assembly from the com-
ponent tank could be properly treated and tested with the water.
glass, a demonstration was performed. The questionable joint was
cleaned with an alkaline solution and water rinsed. upon air dry-
ing methyl ethyl ketone was swabbed around the joint and dried.
The water glass was then applied and allowed to dry for 48 hr (see
Fig. V-22). The unit was then assembled into the hemisphere and
water flow tests proved conclusively the leak between the riveted
plates had been stopped as indicated by single-phase liquid flow.
These procedures were employed on the trap installed in the modi-
fied tank before the final closure weld.
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Fig, V-22 Fuel Trap Assembly Showing Water Glass Seal After Test
b. Fabrication - The screen trap selected for modification
and installation in the rebuilt module fuel tank was welded in
a small evacuated chamber. The completed unit was then passi-
vated in MMH. Repeated attempts to passivate the unit in the
fuel were unsuccessful as manifested by continued evolution of
gas bubbles signifying decomposition of the MMH. The unit was
then immersed in hydrazine in hopes that the hydrazine would re-
duce the surface catalytic reaction by reducing the surface ox-
ides. The procedure was unsuccessful as noted by continued for-
mation of gas bubbles, though at a somewhat slower rate.
I
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A sophisticated cleaning process was devised to clean
the trap unit without destroying the screen cloth. The process
included the steps outlined below:
Mask the screens;
Clean outside surface with alkaline solution such as Cee
Bee Industrial Cleaner;
Clean outside surface with HNO 3 + HF agent. The cleaning
agent was made up of 40% HNO 3 /60% H2 0) + 8% HF. Contact
with the screens was to be avoided;
Immerse entire unit in a 40% HNO 3 solution;
Rinse in demineralized water.
When the process was implemented, the alkaline cleaner made the
surface clean. Application of the HNO 3 + HF foamed considerably.
The HNO 3 + HF was repeated four times after which all foaming
stopped. The unit was then placed in a bath of hot N 2H4 at 202°F
(local water boiling temperature) for 24 hr. Following the suc-
cessful verification of passivation, the unit was cleaned in de-
mineralized water followed by an acetone rince and shipped to the
-vendor for installation in the tank. The completed trap assembly
is shown in Fig. V-23 and V-24.
The lower half of the fuel tank was modified by adding
more weld material at the point of the trap attachment area.
This enabled the trap to be elevated slightly with respect_ to
the tank bottom. When the trap was welded into place in the fuel
tank a Martin Marietta engineer applied the water glass to the
titanium ring area. The water glass was applied after welding
to avoid destroying the bond by the thermal effects of the weld
operation.
The fuel tank was then final welded, acceptance tested,
and shipped to Martin Marietta Corporation with no further dif-
ficulties.
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z
t
l	 Mo.iiLied Trap tiSstinbly, Bottu::; `v itS^
rMCR-68-119 (Part II)
	 V-45
c. Demonstration Testing - The propellant tank was mointed
in the component test fixture for testing according to procedures
developed during Phase II of the program. Seventy-four pounds of
monomethyl hydrazine were loaded into the tank through successive
filters of 5 and 2 microns. The tank was inverted to overfill
the trap, eliminating any possible bubble resident below the trap
in its normal positive 1 g orientation. Off-loading the tank in
a normal 1 g regime to provide the normal fuel load of the tank
was accomplished, resulting in a net load of 49 lb. This assured
the trap was not submerged w 1 :en inverted :*^d was indeed retaining
the trapped volume of propellant in the -1 g condition. Minus 1 g
outflow as completed showing a single phase liquid outflow at a
flowrate of 0.13 lb/sec. A fuel volume of 520 cc was discharged
as determined by collection in a 1000 ml graduate cylinder.
The computed volume of the trap to the level of the win-
dow sectors was 347 cc. The total volume within the tank and
outflow system below the trap weld attachment point is 607 cc.
Allowing for 5 cu in. of trap volume results in a net volume of
530 cc (Fig. V-25). This would indicated the fuel located out-
side the trap was swept out in the discharge. The events were
recorded on film for future presentations.
The tank was then purged with nitrogen and baked at 150°F
for 8 hr. Following this procedure the unit was capped and put
into storage until the module was reassembled.
3. Component Inspection and Modification
a. Solenoid - The solenoid valve incorporated in the module
was Sterer P/N 35580, S/N 2. After the sterilization exposure
and firing, the dielectric strength at 500 vac was 278 camps. As
a result, the No. 27 Formirar wire that does not hold up at 135%
was replaceO. The new coil winding incorporates SML magnet wire.
The insularion of the bobbin spool and end plates is Micomat wet
wound with DC-997 high temperature varnish. All solder attach-
ments, sleeving, and insulation are of high temperature materials.
The finished coil was wrapped with a Teflon tape, type P-421.
The assembled unit was then baked at 400°F for 1 hr. The valve
was acceptance tested and conformed to all requirements. The
valve was then returned to the Martin Marietta Corporation for
reinstallation in the module.
b. Engine - The Marquardt R4--D engine, P/N X-229663, S/N
0001, was returned to the Marquardt Corporation for inspection
and water flow check. To preserve the conditions of the engine
for valid continuation of the sterilization program, it was not
disassembled. Table V-5 presents representative engine charac-
teristics before and after the sterilization and firing test.
J9 Volume 1 - 34i cc
Volume 2 = 530 cc (Total Volume Above
^'	 Reference Level)
Fig. V-25 Fuel Tank Trap Volumes
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Table V-5 Engine Characteristics
Parameter Pretest Posttest
Oxidizer Flow (H 20/PPH) 552 555
Oxidizer Response (ms) 8.3 8.4
Oxidizer Leakage (scc/hr) 0 0
Fuel Flow (H 20/PPH) 438 436
Fuel Response (ms) 6.4 6.4
:7uel Leakage	 (scc/hr) 0.50 0
Table V-5 shows the engine suffered insignificant degradation as
a result of the first sterilization program. On this basis, no
adjustments were made to the flow control orifices. The engine
was returned to Martin Marietta Corporation and reinstalled in
the module.
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C. SYSTEM ASSEMBLY
When the propellant tanks were received from the vendor the
system was reassembled. The assembly activities were performed
in the 100 class laminar flow clean room at the Cold Flow Labora-
tory of the Denver Division.
i. Configuration Changes
Several minor configuration changes were made in the system.
None were of a nature to compromise the objectives of the pro-
;	 gram.
"
	
	 A hand valve was substituted for one of the ordnance valves
because a sufficient quantity of JPL-supplied ordnance valves
were not available. The ordnance valve in the gaseous nitrogen
pressurization system was replaced with a 1/4-in. Republic hand
valve. This type of vale had previously been subjected to the
sterilization enviromient as port of a test fixture in the compo-
nent test phase. Thus, the hermetic seal of each .propellant tank
was maintained and the hazards of a propellant leak were mini-
mized.
The serrated flange seal on the ordnance valve leaked on
several occasions during the previous sterilization exposure.
The action taken during the initial build up was to use longer
through-bolts at the flange, raise the torque to 40 in.-lb and
use backup nuts to relieve the load on the aluminum threads of
the valve body. During the program extension the soft aluminum
washers used as gaskets in the serrated flange were coated with
'	 1-2 mil of Teflon. Further, during installation of the valves a
special tool was used to .take up the torque loads as opposed to
taking some of the load through the serrated flange joint in ques-
t	 tion.
A material change was made in the fuel tank drain line. This
line in the oxidizer circuit failed during the initial program
as a result of thermal stresses set up in the tube. The tube was
fabricated with bend radii as small as two times the tube diameter.
In the fuel line the tube was changed from 6061-T6 to 300 series
stainless steel. This change was a convenience change to allow
easier tube bending and flaring. The change was not made on the
oxidizer line since the hand valve is open during sterilization
and 300 series stainless steel is not compatible with the oxi-
dizer at 275°F.
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As a result of the slightly smaller propellant tanks several
tubing changes were required during the reassembly to assure a
proper fit. This made it necessary to develop new pressurization
lines leading from the pressure regulator outlet "cross" to each
propellant tank. These tubes were fabricated according to the
established drawings, which required the tube to be of 6061-T6
aluminum and 3/8-in. O.D. by 0.035-in. wall thickness.
2. Assembly Verification and Checkout
Several checks were performed to assure proper functioning
of the module. The propellant feedline filters were back flushed
to assure proper operation. There was never any evidence of con-
tamination present. This was done as a precaution. The pressure
system filter was not back flowed. It was welded into the system
interfacing directly with the regulator inlet. It was not possi-
ble to back flow through the pressurization filter without also
back flowing through the regulator. It was decided there was more
risk in this procedure than in the improper operation of the fil-
ter. Therefore the pressurization filter was not back flowed.
Several of the Vacco hand valves leaked. Four valves were
required in the module. Two valves showed no leakage, one was
leaking at 2.5 scc/min of GN2 , and one was leaking at 50i scc/min.
The higher leaking valve had been installed in the oxidizer drain
line in the closed position.
The stem in the valve was replaced. To replace the entire
valve would have required welding and modifying a valve body as
described in Part I of the final report. Since the valve seat
is hard anodized 1100 aluminum and the stem is 1100 aluminum in
the "0" or soft condition it was reasoned that the stem was the
only part in poor condition. This rationale was supported by the
results of the first sterilization exposure of the component
valve, which showed extreme corrosion, and by the results of the
materials compatibility program, which showed anodized aluminum
as compatible in N204 . The repair of the valve was successful
with the new leakage measured at 0.1 scc/min.
The valves were repositioned to put the valves with no leak-
age in the propellant drain line of either tank, the reworkE3
valve in the oxidizer tank vent position, and the valve with
nominal leakage in the fuel tank vent position. In this position
the valve is not opened and therefore the risk was minimal. None
of the three valves with little or no leakage were disassembled.
An objective of the program was to learn as much as possible. If
the valves were reworked, degradation added by a second exposure
could not be determined.
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During checkout after module reassembly, the regulator was
found to be inoperative. The action taken was to cycle the inlet
pressure between zero and 350 psig rapidly while tapping on the
regulator diaphragm housing lightly with a plastic mallet. This
action did cause the regulator to begin operation. The initial
leakage of the unit on a 0.5 cu ft ullage resulted in a pressure
rise rate of 68 psi/min. Repeated cycling improved the operation
of the regulator so that the final leakage rate was 26.4 scc/hr.
This compares to a specification value of 10 scc/hr and 14.5
scc/hr at the initiation of sterilization on the initial buildup.
After sterilization and before the first firing the regulator
r
leakage was zero.
The lack of operation of the regulator was a significant
program resuit. The 16-month shelf storage of the regulator is
the same order of magnitude as a mission to the near planets.
Mission success would depend on regulator operation.
Each component was exercised to obtain the appropriate per-
formance data for a baseline before sterilization. These data
are presented and compared to past sterilization data in a later
section of the report.
3. Propellant Loading
New propellant loads were established for this firing because
the modified propellant tanks were slightly smaller than the
original design. The original tanks had a volume of 2350 cu in.
The fuel tank volume was reduced by the material lost in
cutting the tank in two pieces following the initial firing. The
oxidizer tank was redesigned to put the diaphragm on the center-
line and reworked to accomodate the separation following the dia-
phragm rupture during assembly. The resulting tank volumes then
were:
Fuel,	 2217 cu in.;
Oxidizer, 1937 cu in:
The maximum loadable quantities based on propellant densities at
135% were as follows:
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Density (lb/cu ft) Maximum Loadable (lb)
Fuel	 47.95	 61.4
Oxidizer	 64.30	 70.5
The propellant loading inventory for each tank established on the
basis of a 290-sec run is given in Table V-6.
Table V-6 Propellant Loading Inventory
Fuel Oxidizer
Flow Rate	 (lb/min) 8.69 13.91
Usable,	 290 sec	 (lb) 42.00 67.10
Decomposition 4%,	 0.5% (lb) 1.68 0.35
Propellant sample 60 cc (lb) 0.12 0.20
Trapped in feedline	 (lb) 0.06 0.30
Loading uncertainty (lb) 0.50 0.50
Outage,	 2% (lb) 0.84 1.39
Fuel bias	 (lb) 1.26 --
Total 46.46 69.84
Actually loaded aboard the module were 51 lb of fuel and 70 lb
of oxidizer.
The planned run time was 280 sec based on earlier precedent
set for the first firing during the readiness review. The run
time was selected on the basis that the system was not fully
qualified and only limited performance history was available.
The placement of the diaphragm on the equator of the oxidizer
tank meant the diaphragm could be cycled through from top to
bottom. Previously the diaphragm was 0.8 in. above the equator,
resulting in 10.60 lb of oxidizer trapped in the tank. This ex-
plains why the tank volume could be reduced 413 cu in. and still
achieve the same run duration as obtained in the initial module
assembly.
MCR-68-119 (Part II)V-52
D. SYSTEM STERILIZATION EXPOSURE
The module sterilization exposure began on April 14 and was
completed on April 23, 1969. The exposure consisted of three
30 -hr cycles at 135 °C or 275 °F. Each cycle included a 6-hr heat-
ing phase at 19 °C/hr and a 6 -hr cooling phase at the same rate
for a total cycle time of 42 hr.
Cycle 2 was extended and penalized because of an inadvertant
shutdown resul.:ing from an abnormality in the facility controls.
The system accumulated 38 hr at 135 °C as verified by fuel tank
total pressure.
Tabu V -7 presents the typical values of module and chamber
parameters of importance.
Table V -7 Sterilization Data
Chamber
Cycle	 Temperature (°F)
1	 274
2	 275
3	 274
Oxidizer Tank
Pressure (psia)
820
810
830
Fuel Tank
Pressure (psia'i
85
83
83
The values in Table V -7 agree with the experience of the pre-
vious sterilization exposures. The fuel pressure indicates some
decomposition took place, but no more than previously. The ex-
pected vapor pressure of MMH at 135°C is 63 psia. The data in-
dicate the decomposition discontinued during the initial cycle.
The spread in the oxidizer pressure equals 20 psi. This
spread is :.ot unreasonable when it is realized that a 1500-psi
gage was used for the recordings. A spread of 20 psi represents
a 1 1/3% spread or +2/3%.
-	
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•	 E. SYSTEM FIRING READINESS
•	 Before the second firing attempt a readiness review was con-
ducted. The propellant sample assay results were reviewed, the
component functional characteristics were verified, and the oper-
ational procedures were reviewed.
1. Propellant Samples
During the prefixing readiness review period the fuel tank trap
from the component unit was examined. The inspection revealed the
water-glass sealant was sloughing off the unit after a shelf stor-
age of 9 months. The water glass had been applied to the top of
the trap to seal the faying surfaces so that propellant outflow
could be demonstrated in a -1_g regime. Earlier compatibility tests
•.rith hot fuel demonstrated compatibility, but the requirement for
a passivation procedure with a 75% water/25% fuel mixture was over-
looked. Sinc.: the water glass was installed in the module tank
after the trap was welded in the tank, the possibility of water
glass particles entering the propellant feed system and being
trapped on the 5p filter upstream of the engine was of primary
concern.
A propellant sample withdrawn from the fuel tank after the
second sterilization cycle did show a considerable contamination
level. On the basis of this result a test was conducted to deter-
mine if the water glass that was in the hardened state was soluble
in water. The solubility test of the water glass in the 75% water/
25% fuel fixture gave positive results. An additional sample was
withdrawn from the module after the final sterilization cycle for
analysis. The results of this and all of the propellant sampling
is presented in Table V-8. The analysis of the final sample indi-
cates the fuel was suitable for firing.
This may be explained by the sequence by which the water glass
was applied to the trap. As noted above, the water glass was ap-
plied to the top surface of the trap only after the trap was welded
into the fuel tank. In effect the propellant must pass through the
two screens of the trap rated at 301 and then pass through a 5p
filter before entering the engine. On the basis of the results in
Table V-8 and the rationale above, it was concluded the propellant
t:	 condition was satisfactory for the engine firing.
Skl.
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Table V-8 Propellant Sampling Results
Sample Source
Sample Results
Oxidizer Fuel
Facility Supply N204, 98.64% MMH, 98.12%
(before loading) N0, 0.59% H2O & Misc, 1.88%
H2O, 0.11% (Barrel S/N HSO48)
Module Loading N2041	 99.95% MMH, 99.03%
System	 (Presterili- NO, Not Reported H2O & Misc, 0.97%
zation) H2O, 0.01%
Module Fuel Tank Particle
after 2nd Steriliza- Size	 No.
tion Cycle 50-250	 85
250-600	 4
600-1000	 7
>1000	 2
Module Tanks After N2041 99.04% MMH, 98.90%
Final	 (3rd)	 Sterili- NO, 0.48% H2O & Misc, 1.10%
zation Cycle H2O, 0.02% Note:	 One 300µ particle
of resinous ap-
pearance; two smal-
ler silicious par-
ticles	 (approx 30
to 50p) .
2. Component Functional Verification
After the second series of sterilization cycles the module was
removed from the chamber and installed in the firing test stand.
The engine thrust chamber valves and the regulator performance were
paramount to the module operation. The performance of these and
the solenoid valve were checked in accordance with established pro-
cedures. The results of these tests and of those conducted before
the sterilization are presented in Table V-9. The continuous data
for the regulator and thrust chamber valves are valid. For the
solenoid valve rebuilt to overcome the coil wire insulation break-
down, the shelf life experience is not valid. The valve was re-
built and returned to the module in September 1968. It was then
installed on the module and not actuated until April 1969. No
difficulty was experienced with the valve.
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Table V-9 Component Performance History
Component
October 1967,
Initial
Condition
January 1968,
Poststerilization
Exposure, 6
	 -
ETO, 6 72-hr
Cycles
April 1969,
Dormant
Storage
April	 1969,.
Poststerlization
Exposure,
3 30-hr Cveles
Thrust Chamber Valves
Oxidizer Valve
Opening Response, max/min 	 (sec) 0.0092/0.0089 0.0098/0.0095 0.0099/0.0097 0.0091/0.0088
Closing Response, max/min	 (sec) 0.0062/0.0060 0.0068/0.0061 0.0077/0.0066 0.0081/0.0075
Leakage - External	 (bubbles GN-) 0 0 0
Internal	 (cc GN2 /hr) 0 0 0 0
Fuel Valve
Opening Response, max/min	 (sec) 0.0073/0.0070 0.0078/0.0068 0.0080/0.0077 0.0074/0.0071
Closing Response, max/min	 (sec) 0.0070/0.0062 0.0078/0.0075 0.0085/0.0074 0.0080/0.0077
Leakage at 250 psi-g:
External	 (bubbles GN2 ) 0 0 0 0
Internal	 (cc GN2 /hr) 12 0 0 0
GN,, Loading Solenoid Valve* (1) MW
P/N LAB 6002516-001 Sterer P/N 35580
Leakage, External	 (scc/sec helium) 0 0 0 0
Dielectric Strength (u amp at 500 VAC) 6 278 104 114
Regulator MMC P/N LAB 6002515-009 Sterer
P/N 35540 S/N 2
Internal Leakage	 (scc/hr GN2 ) 14.5 0 26.4 24.4
External Leakage (bubbles GN2) 0 0 0 0
Regulation:
Inlet	 Pressure,	 Initial	 (prig) 1498 1528 1550 1530
inlet Pressure, Final	 (psig) 350 350 350 350
Average Flow Rate, GN2 (lb/sec) 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014
Outlet	 Pressure Var, max/min (psig) 250/i^" 248/244 244/240 246/242
Hysteresis:
Initial	 Outlet Lockup Pressure	 (psig) 263 259 259 257.5
Outlet	 Pressure Range	 (psig) 250/247 258/252 250.5/259 251/258.5
Response:
Inlet	 Pressure, Average	 (psig) 1520 1517 1420 1415
Outlet	 Pressure, Lockup	 (psig) 261 257 258.5 258.5
Overshoot	 (psig) 0 0 0 0
'The solenoid coil was rewound with high temperature materials after first sterilizat;on and firing.
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The engine thrust chamber valves show some scatter in the re-
sponse time figures but the proper lead time of fuel leading the
oxidizer valve was maintained in every case. In general the Mar-
quardt engine propellant valves were trouble free, and therefore
very high in reliability.
The regulator, after smooth operation was established, achieved
performance within specification limits on every item except leak-
age. The internal leakage of the system did degrade and was erratic
over the time period under discussion. The regulator was welded
into the module and therefore was not given any special care. The
system was opened to remove the propellant tanks and then reassem-
bled under the clean conditions established for this program.
As a result of the values shown in Table V-9, it was concluded
that the components were performing adequately and a firing could
be conducted with confidence.
3. Procedures
All necessary procedures were updated to reflect the current
configuration and sterilization exposure. The manual valve incor-
porated in the system in place of an ordnance valve between the
pressurant tank and regulator inlet required procedural changes to
open the valve before clearing the personnel from the firing stand.
The contract requirement for three 30-hr dry heat steriliza-
tions also required new procedures that were generated and approved.
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F. SYSTEM FIRING
Following the three 30-hr dry heat sterilization exposures
•	 and system functional checkout the system was prepared for a
firing on April 29, 1969. This firing was aborted when the pres-
surant storage pressure bled down to zero following actuation
of the ordnance valves.
Following an investigation of the condition of the module,
corrective action was agreed to with the contract technical 	 •
monitor and implemented for a later firing attempt. The second
firing attempt on May 2, 1969 was successful.
Each of the firings are described in the paragraphs below.
1. First Firing Attempt
The schematic of the module configuration is shown in Fig.
V-26. The procedure i.•as followed normally through opening of
the hand valve and pressure regulator lockup. Lockup pressure
was 262 psig. After a short delay to correct a power problem
on the firing stand, the pressures of the storage sphere and
regulator outlet pressure were as follows:
Pnt - 1600 psig;
Pro = 269 psig.
The next step in the procedure was to actuate all of the ordnance
valves to drop propellants to the engine and pressurize the pro-
pellant tanks. When this step was implemented the pressure in
the gas storage sphere bled down to zero. A review of the data
showed the propellant tank pressure only reached pressures of
Pot = 119 psig at 27 sec;
Pft = 117 psig at 26 sec.
The rise rat- of the propellant pressures was very slow. A tech-
nician near the test stand was able to detect gas escaping from
the system. When the propellant tank pressures bled down to zero
it was decided to isolate the propellant tanks by closing the fuel
tank isolation valves located on top and bottom of the tank so the
hypergolic vapors could not react further.
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Investigation and examination of the module revealed the
pressurization line just upstream of the ordnance valve, EXV-3,
had a sizable hole in it. Figures V-27 and V-28 show a close up
of this line and failure.
A careful review of the condition of the module revealed no
other abnormal conditions or functions. Since the objectives of
the program were concerned with the module performance using
sterilized propellants it was decided, with the concurrence of
the contract technical monitor, to alter the system plumbing and
refire the module without off loading the propellants.
2. Cause of Failure
A close examination of the data traces revealed: (1) the
regulator pressure and pressurant tank pressure were constant
before the ordnance valve actuation; (2) the propellant tank
pressure rise rate was approximately one-half the value of the
initial firing; and (3) the rise rate was lower from the very
initiation of pressurization. The tank tup traces are shown in
Fig. V-29,
The above circumstances directed our attention to the ordn-
ance valve to find the cause of failure.
The ordnance valve from position EXV-3 was removed from the
system when it was available and sectioned for complete examina-
tion. Figure V-30 shows the valve after it was sectioned. From
the figure the cause of failure was quite apparent. The portion
of the valve to the left is the normally closed half that does
not contain a guillotine or plunger as it would if it had been
assembled properly.
The failure sequence was initiated at the ignition of the
ordnance squib (not shown in the figure). The explosive charge
burned through the tube plug and entered the plumbing syscem.
The molten aluminum and the burning powder then went both direc-
tions from the valve. This would indicate the products entered
the fuel izank and the pressurization line. It did not burn
through the tube integrally attached to the ordnance valve be-
cause the tube wall thickness was approximately 0.100 in. The
burning charge then went further upstream into the aluminum tube
that was only 0.035 in. in wall thickness. The failure then was
at the first curved section of the tube as shown in Fig. V-27 and
V-28.
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Fig. V-27 Pressurization Tube
Fig, V-28 Pressurization Tube, Close Up
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Fig, V-30 Ordnance Valve, Sectional View
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3. Recovery Action
•	 The module plumbing was revised to the configuration shown
in Figure V-31. This provided a propellant feed system by by-
passing the ordnance valves that had been closed in the earlier
attempt as a safety precaution.
Before refiring the module the procedures were revised and
carefully reviewed to be certain nothing was overlooked in order
to quickly refire the module. Calculations were performed to
ascertain the engine mixture ratio would still be within accept-
able limits.
As a result of the pressure drop calculations it was decided
to install 1/2-in, ball valves in the position of FDBV and FPV.
This valve size required supporting brackets and longer tube runs
so that the valves could be firmly positioned. The larger valves
and longer tube runs provided a lower pressure drop than the
smaller valve with short coupled tubing runs. The calculated
pressure drops and engine mixture ratio are presented in Table
V-10,
The longer tube run and unbalanced tube volumes were of some
concern. To alleviate any potential problem the fuel line was
bled in before the firing to make sure both propellants were hard
on the engine thrust chamber valves. This procedure was reviewed
with the engine manufacturer. The procedure and calculated engine
mixture ratio were both approved by Marquardt.
The module pressurant tank was reloaded with nitrogen to 1590
psia. The new plumbing was leak checked and all the control
harness leads were voltage checked end to end to be sure the new
functions of valves were properly hooked into the control console.
4, Second Firing Attempt
Following the above checkout activities the engine module was
successfully fired for 280 sec on May 2, 1969. Visual observa-
tion on the TV monitor and real-time data traces showed proper
module operation. The firing operation is shown in Fig, V-32.
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Table V-10 Calculated Propulsion Module Performance (Revised Fuel Feed System)
A.	 Calculated Pressure Drop - Revised Fuel System
1/4 in.	 tubing - fuel tank to FDV valtie: 7.1 psi
FDV valve - (corroborated in HL0 flow test): 7.8 psi
1/4-in, tubing - FDV to 1/4 x 3/8 union: 0.4 psi
1/2-in.	 tubing and two 1/2-in, ball valves: 0.2 psi
Assumed 1/2-in,	 fitting losses: 0.2 psi
3/8-in.	 tubing - module panel to filter tee: 0.4 psi
Total loss: 16.1 psi
Pressure drop - standard fuel system 	 (actual): 40.0 psi
Less ordnance valve contribution (calculated): 1.6 psi
Pressure drop of remaining part of standard system: 38.4 psi
Pressure drop	 - entire feed system:
Added tubing and valves: 16.1 psi
Unchanged part of system: 38,4 psi
Total System: 54.5 psi
B.	 Calculated Changes in Mass Flow and Mixture Ratio
Previous injector pressure drop: 	 Pf = 213 p,ig
P	 =	 93 psig
c
AP120 psi
inj
Injector ^P - revised system:
Previous P f :	 21^ psig
Additional pP (54.5-40.0)	 14.5 psi (use 15 psi)
Revised system P 	 198 prig
P (assumed unchanged)	 93 psig
c
New AP.	 105 psiink
Injector flow rate change:
Previous fuel flow rate (actual)	 0.146 lbm sec.
105 psi 1/2
New fuel flow rate: 0.146 lbm
 sec 210 si.	
= 0.137 lbm sec,
P•
Mixture ratio change:
Previous oxidizer flow rate (assumed unchanged): 0.226 lb
m 
sec.
0.226 lbm sec
0.137 lbm secNew mixture ratio =
= 1.65
Previous mixture ratio (actual) = 1.54
Design mixture ratio = 1.59
From above:
Previous MR was 
1.54 
x 100 = 97% of design MR
1.59
New MR will. be
 1 :65 4: 100 = 104 71 of design MR
f
owl i 1
fw/ CYN
Ty^.
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A
Fig, V-32 Module Firing Operation
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G. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
The firing performance of the engine is presented in Table
V-11. From the table and the engine calibration data the follow-
ing thrust and specific impulse were obtained.
F	 MR	 I_P
6000 ft	 69.0	 1.60	 188
Vacuum Condition	 108	 294
This compares with the data from the initial firing on January 16,
1968.
F	 MR	 Isp
6000 ft	 69.7	 1.53	 1-88
Vacuum Condition	 109	 294
From these data it can be seen that the performance parameters
varied less than 1.0%, which is due to the change in mixture ratio
resulting from the alteration of the module propellant feedline.
During the initial. firing in 1968 there was no discernible
pressure drop from the regulator outlet to the propellant tank top.
The most recent firing showed a pressure drop of 3 and 4 psi to
the oxidizer and fuel tank top respectively, resulting from the
solenoid actuated valves. The regulator performance in the run
condition, as opposed to the checkout condition, deserves explana-
tion. In both the criginal and follow-on firing, an apparent shift
in regulation pressure was noted as seen below:
Original Firing Follow-on Firing
Checkout pressure (psia)	 260
	
255
Run Pressure (psia)	 265
	
265
Investigation of the recording equipment reveals that consis-
tent equipment was used for the appropriate checkout and firing.
Also all calibration procedures were adhered to. The proper ex-
planation appears to be that the lower reading during checkout re-
sults from the full regulator flow passing the pressure pickup out-
side of the module interface. Contrary to this, during the firing
+
	
	
the pressure pickup is reading the pressure in a static tube that
is sensing the complex flow split occurring in the distribution
cross. Hence the checkout configuration is sensing the effect of
a velocity head in a smaller tube, the pressure drop through the
tube from the tubing cross to the pickup, and the loss associated
with the 90 deg turn through the cress.
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Table V-11 Propulsion Module Performance
Predicted
Parameter
	
Value	 T + 0 sec T + 5 sec* T + 140 sec T + 275 sec T + 280 sec
Burn Time (sec)	 280	 ---	 ---	 ---	 ---	 280
GN Tank Pressure, P	 (psia)	 1550	 1590/1040	 1035	 770	 535	 530
nt
Pressure, Regulator Outlet,
P	 (psia) 255 265 265 265 265 265
ro
Pressure, Oxidizer Tank, P
(psia)
	
°t 255 272 262 263 262 262
Pressure, Fuel Tank, P
ft(psia) 255 272 261 262 261 261
Pressure, Oxidizer Feedline,
Po
	(psia) 212 272 213 213 212 213
Pressure, Fuel Feedline, P
f(psia) 210 275 215 215 215 215
Chamber Pressure, P c (psia) 105 0 104 104 104 104
Flow Rate, Oxidizer, w
lb	 sec	 0 0.226 0 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226
m
Flow Rate, Fuel, w 
	 lbm	sec 0.137 0 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141
:Mixture Patio, MR (oxid/fuel) 1.65 ---- 1.60 I.60 1.60 1.60
*Values read at stabiliked conditions between T + 5 sec and T + 30 sec.
TVC Response:	 Opening oxidizer = 0.0119 sec, fuel = 0.0089 sec;
Closing oxidizer = 0.0087 sec, fuel = 0.0089 sec.
Ignition 0.0008 sec after oxidizer TVC full open.
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H. PARTS INSPECTION
The cause of the system abort was discussed thoroughly in Sec-
tion F of this chapter and will not be discussed further here.
Several other parts were examined after the firing to determine
what if any degradation had taken place.
1. Oxidizer Tank
The diaphragm of the oxidizer tank was recycled back to its
original position and leak checked. The leakage determination was
made with gaseous nitrogen at 1.0 psi differential pressure. The
leakage value was 9.6 std cc/hr. This value compares to 0.16 std
cc/hr determined at acceptance testing of the unit, and 78 std cc/
hr for the component tank delivery that had not been resterilized.
The tank has not been disturbed pending delivery of the parts to
JPL.
2, Regulator
The regulator was disassembled following the firing to deter-
mine the cause of the sticking experienced before sterilization.
Figures V-33 show the condition of the spring guide and cap assem-
bly as they were disassembled. The photos show an accumulation
of a dark film residue located between the surfaces of these parts.
When these ?arts were removed there was some adhesion of the parts.
A light oil was found on the back side of the diaphragm that caused
the discoloration on the spring guide.
The inlet and outlet sections of the regulator showed no ac-
cumulation of any foreign material. The integral inlet filter
was also in a good clean condition.
The regulator surfaces shown in the photos were not corroded
in any ti ay . The film that caused the sticking was dark in color
resembling molybdenum disulphide and was easily wiped off. The
spring pressure forces that were undisturbed for 15 months con-
tributed to the parts adhesion.
The regulator manufacturer, Sterer Engineering, has confirmed
that a light oil was placed behind the diaphragm to aid in posi-
tioning it during assembly. The p roject engineer for this regu-
lator reproduced the sticking by placing oil between the spring
guide and cap assembly on a unit at the Sterer plant.
•
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rig. V-33 Regulator Spring Guide and Cap Assembly
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The suggested corrective action is either to knurl these sur-
faces or mar.hine lands in the cap assembly to reduce the finely
machined contact area.
3. Hand Valve
The hand valve located in the fuel drain system was removed
and disassembled to determine the cause of valve leakage. Figure
V-34 shows the condition of the valve stem. The uneven loading
or seating impression on the stem can be seen in the figure. Fur-
ther there is evidence of scarfing on the side of the stem. This
evidence is indicative of overloading the valve stem due to exces-
sive torque applied to the valve.
The design is based on a steel valve, but for this program it
was modified to use aluminum. As a result the recommended torque
was 10 in.-lb with a in4ximum of 20 in.-lb. Experience with the
valve led to the finding that leakage could be expected at 10 in.-
lb and instructions were issued to raise the torque to 17 in.-lb
with the maximum of 20 in.-lb. This problem would be expected,
operating so close to the design limit.
Figure V-35 shows the condition of the Teflon chevron seals
and general contamination in the stem area. The condition of cold
flowing of the Teflon seals is a duplicate of the valves tested
in the component task. This valve was not disassembled following th
the initial scope of work.
Leakage data for this valve shows leakage was zero at the
time of refurbishment and it was therefore installed in the liquid
drain line. Leakage was evident following propellant loading ac-
tivities. It was overstressed at that time.
4. Solenoid Valve
The solenoid valve changes resulting from a breakdown in the
coil insulation were presented on page V-45. The valve leakage
and coil dielectric strength history is presented in Table V-9.
As can be seen the dielectric current leakage increased from 104
µamp to 114 µamp during this series of tests. This change com-
pares to an increase of 272 µamp with the original design. No
operational problems with the valve were encountered during the
second test series.
rr	
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5. F1anee Joint
The coating of the soft aluminum washer and the improved in-
stallation procedure used in the ordnance valve seal as described
on page V-48 was completely successful.
6. Lines and Joints
Several line and joint configurations were used in the module
design to accumulate as much data as possible. Lines of 301 stain-
less steel, of 6061-T6 aluminum and several transition joints
from titanium to steel and from steel to aluminum were used. Both
AN and welded connections in addition to the serrated washer con-
nection at the ordnance valve were used. All joints and lines
performed satisfactorily. There were no leaks in the system.
The line rupture experienced as a result of the improper ordnance
valve assembly was not attributable to the tube design.
I J.
5-t,
MCR-68-119 (Part 11)	 V-73
/ it-	 r I
Fig. V-34 Hand Valve SLt,!iii
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T. RELIABILITY EVALUATION
The reliability estimates shown in Table V-12 are unchanged
from Part I of the final report. The limited test samples pre-
clude an extensive statistical analysis necessary to obtain a
meaningful quantitative estimate of hardware reliability.
The testing conducted after the 15-month storage that followed
the initial firing operations revealed a binding failure mode of
the regulator. This failure mode was overcome by tapping and ex-
ercising regulator. The cause of this failure was a migration of
a light oil used in the valve assembly between two faying surfaces,
causing a severe adhesion. This failure may be overcome by down-
grading the surfaces by knurling or by reducing the contact area
by providing contact lands. In either case the filure is under-
stood and may be corrected; therefore, no reduction of the generic
failure rate is justified.
Table V-12 Sterilizable Liquid Propulsion
System Reliability Estimate
Compunents
(Quantity) G	 106FR
Launch allu
Cruise Phase,
6500 hr
burn
Phase,
0.083 hr
Total
Mission Reliabi	 i'.,,
Propellant Diaphragm
Tank (2) 1.5 .001950 .000246 .00219u .997804
N2
 Storage Tank 0.18 .000117 .000015 .000132 .999868
Press Regulator 0.7 .000046 .000058 .000103 .999895
Filter	 (3) 0.04 .000008 .000009 .00001 .999983
Ordnance Valve
N.C.	 (5) 1000 -- -- .0050 .995000
Ordnance Valve
N.O.	 (5) 10 - -- .0000-)u .999950
Thrust Chamber
Valves	 (2) 2.27 .000295 .000374 .000661, .999331
Orifice Assembly (2) 0.01 .000001 .000002 .000003 .999997
Test	 Point	 (7) 0.01 .000046 .000006 .000052 .999948
Lines and Fittings 0.1 .000065 .000008 .000073 .999927
Structure O.Oui -- -- -- X99999
Total
	
S y stem .991581
i
